Consider the optimal regulation of a persistent pollutant. Because the pollutant is persistent, the levels of pollution in neighboring periods are causally related, and it is necessary to determine an optimal trajectory of emissions. The optimal level of emissions in any period depends on the costs to reduce emissions, but these costs are generally private information to the polluting firms. A regulatory agency may solicit firms' cost functions, but if the firms know how the agency will use the information they provide, they may have an incentive to lie. Hence the agency's problem is to design a regulatory scheme that elicits truthful responses from firms and achieves the optimal trajectory of emissions. This paper describes such a scheme, the extension to a dynamic setting of a scheme found by Evan Kwerel. The purpose of this paper is to describe this ''dynamic Kwerel scheme,'' derive its properties, and describe the associated trajectory of emissions. ᮊ
INTRODUCTION
Consider the regulation of a persistent pollutant. The optimal level of emissions at any time depends on the costs incurred by polluting firms to reduce their emissions, and these costs are generally private information to the firms. Almost all of the literature on the regulation of pollution that addresses the issue of private cost information equates emissions with pollution. The identification of emissions and pollution is appropriate for pollutants that decay or dissipate rapidly such as noise and many air pollutants, but is inappropriate for persistent pollutants such as solid waste or ground water contamination. Emissions of a persistent pollutant in one period affect the pollution level in subsequent periods. In this dynamic setting, a regulatory scheme should achieve an optimal trajectory of emissions; i.e., an optimal level of emissions throughout some planning period.
We consider regulatory frameworks of the following form. At some initial time Ž . ''time zero'' the regulatory agency does two things:
Ž .
1 They ask each firm to reveal its cost function for emissions.
2 They announce a regulatory scheme having two parts:
Ž . a A set of regulatory instruments, e.g., pollution licenses, effluent charges, etc.
b A mechanism that maps the firms' reported costs into parameter values associated with the instruments, e.g., the number of licenses or the amount of the effluent charge.
As firms know how the information they provide will be used in the design of regulations that affect them, they may have an incentive to mislead the agency; we Ž . assume that firms choose their answers to 1 to maximize their profits given the announced scheme. Given a true set of cost functions, the agency can construct the optimal trajectory of emissions. Hence, the agency would like to find a scheme that Ž . achieves two goals simultaneously: the scheme should a induce firms to reveal Ž . their cost functions truthfully and b achieve the optimal level of emissions at all times. A scheme that achieves the first goal is said to be ''incentive compatible,'' and a scheme that achieves the second is said to be ''optimum achieving. ' ' These goals are in general opposed. Finding a scheme that achieves both goals can be difficult, especially in a dynamic setting.
This paper describes a scheme for the control of a persistent pollutant that is both incentive compatible and optimum achieving under some weak conditions. This scheme is an extension to a dynamic setting of an ingenious scheme devised w x by Kwerel 23 . The principal goals of this paper are to describe this ''dynamic Kwerel scheme,'' derive its properties, and to describe the trajectories of emissions and pollution implied by this scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections review related research and Kwerel's scheme. Section 4 describes how Kwerel's conceptual framework may be extended to the case of a persistent pollutant and describes the optimal trajectories of emissions and pollution. Section 5 describes my dynamic Kwerel Ž . scheme and states as Theorems 3 and 4 its most important properties. Section 6 is a conclusion and discussion. There are two appendices. Appendix A contains proofs of the major theorems 2 and Appendix B gives an example of a dynamic Kwerel scheme.
RELATED RESEARCH
w x Within recent papers on pollution, a substantial number 5, 11, 14, 19, 38, 42 deal w x with the dynamics of pollution control, and a fair number 1, 13, 35᎐37 deal with the incenti¨e compatibility problems caused by firms' private information; however, the intersection of these two sets is almost empty. The two articles by Xepapadeas w x 43, 44 incorporate both dynamics and incomplete information, but deal with the problem of monitoring compliance rather than the problem of soliciting firms' w x private information. Gaudet, Lasserre, and Long 18 analyze a dynamic adverse selection problem in a nonrenewable resource industry, but assume that the cost parameter that is the agent's private information is stochastically independent from one period to the next; consequently, the regulatory agency cannot draw any inference about the agent's costs in the next period from observations in this period. Hence, the agency's informational problem is static even though the resource base has a dynamic structure. 2 Almost universally, when the phrase ''it can be shown that'' appears in this paper, a more detailed w x and thorough discussion may be found in Benford 6 . It is more interesting to compare the dynamic Kwerel scheme with other research on the design of regulations in a dynamic setting when firms have private information. The bulk of contract theory takes place in a static setting. To fix ideas, consider the situation of a regulatory agency and a firm, where the agency's objective function includes parameters known only to the firm; these parameters define the firm's ''type.'' At time 0, the agency offers a menu of contracts and the firm makes a selection. The contract selected by the firm depends on, and generally reveals, the firm's type. Without loss of generality, the agency may restrict the menu of contracts to those that require the firm to reveal its type, and w x that give the firm no incentive to lie; this is the ''revelation principle'' 4 . The requirement that the firm have no incentive to lie is the ''incentive compatibility'' constraint. At time 1 the contract is fulfilled. It is usually not possible for the agency to maximize its objective function for all possible types. Instead, the agency must give up something in order to induce firms to reveal their type truthfully. That is, the ''first best'' solution is generally not feasible as it is not incentive compatible, and in this case the agency must design the menu of contracts so that a ''second best'' solution is obtained, i.e., the agency's objective function is maximized subject to the incentive compatibility constraint. This conclusion, however, is dependent on the structure of the model and there are exceptions; Kwerel's scheme is such an exception.
In reality agencies deals with firms over an extended period of time and this gives the agency an opportunity to gather information about the firm and revise the w x contract or menu of contracts if it so chooses. Several authors 2, 3, 30, 39 analyze the situation under the assumption that the agency is able to commit ex ante to a menu of contracts that hold throughout the planning period. In the context of pollution control, ''commitment'' means that the agency will actually use the announced scheme and firms believe this when they report their costs. Although w x there are generally real gains to commitment 24, 29 , the temptation to revise the menu of contracts in the light of new information about the firm can be strong. The propensity of government agencies to revise their regulations in the light of w x new information is the basis of the ''ratchet effect' ' 17, 20, 41 . If the agency is not able to commit ex ante to a fixed menu of contracts, then the situation must be w x modeled as a dynamic game, and the analysis can be quite complex 21 . Among w x other difficulties, the revelation principle no longer applies in this situation 22 . In w x a fairly simple two period model, Laffont and Tirole 25, 26 found that no separating equilibrium exists in the first period. That is, no first period menu of contracts will allow the agency to determine precisely the types of all firms. The intuition behind this result is clear. In the static case, the firms' private information allows them to earn positive profits. In the two period case, if a firm's choice of contract in the first period would reveal its type, the agency would be able to use this information to reduce their profits to zero in the second period. Hence firms w x have an incentive to ''pool'' in the first period in order to conceal their types 27 . Again, however, this general negative conclusion is dependent on the structure of the model and there do exist exceptions, i.e., dynamic regulatory schemes where the agency has no difficulty with ex ante commitment. Perhaps the most impressive of these is the ''incremental surplus subsidy scheme'' of Sappington and Sibley w x w x 32᎐34 , which follows the work of Loeb and Magat 28 , Vogelsang and Finsinger w x w x w x 40 , Sappington 31 , and Finsinger and Vogelsang 15, 16 . The dynamic Kwerel scheme described herein also provides an exception to this general negative conclusion. Because the dynamic Kwerel scheme is both incentive compatible and optimum achieving, firms have no incentive to lie, the optimal trajectory of emissions is achieved, and the agency has no incentive to revise its regulations.
KWEREL'S SCHEME
Kwerel considers a single pollutant emitted by a large number n of firms, and assumes that the environmental impact of the pollutant depends only on the total amount of the pollutant emitted and not on which firm emitted the pollutant. Let Ž . u denote the total amount of emissions and let D u denote the environmental Ž . Ž . damages in monetary terms caused by the pollutant. The damage function D и is Ž . assumed to be public knowledge. We assume that D и is increasing and strictly Ž . Ž . Ž . convex; i.e., DЈ u ) 0 and DЉ u ) 0 for all u. Let C u be the minimal cost to 
C и is decreasing on the relevant domain, i.e., on 0, u , where u ' Ý u . Also, is1 i Ž . Ž . it can be shown that CЉ и ) 0, so C и is strictly convex. As noted above, firmŝ Ž . may not tell the truth when asked to reveal their cost functions. Let C и be firm Kwerel's scheme is a mixed effluent chargerlicense scheme. The scheme employs two instruments: L transferable licenses to pollute are issued, and a subsidy of e per license in excess of emissions is paid to firms holding such licenses. Emissions for each firm are limited to the number of licenses they hold. The mechanism used to determine L and e is as follows: L and e are set equal to thê Ž . Ž . coordinates of the intersection of yCЈ и and DЈ и , sô
Note that Kwerel's scheme does not require the agency to have a prior opinion Ž . Ž . about C и , it does not assume that C и has any particular functional form, and it Ž . Ž . Ž does not restrict the form of the deviation of C и from C и . Thus in the words of w x w x Sappington and Sibley 32 , following Loeb and Magat 28 and Vogelsang and w x. Finsinger 40 , Kwerel's scheme is an ''anonymous regulatory mechanism.''
Moreo¨er, under this scheme the le¨el of total emissions will be optimal.
The intuition behind Kwerel's theorem is shown in Fig. 1 . We say ''costs arêŽ
As n is ''large,'' we assume that a competitive market for licenses forms and that firms take the market price of licenses as given exogenously. Let p and u denote the price of a license and the level of emissions that obtain under â Ž . reported cost function C и , and let p* and u* denote the price of a license and the level of emissions if costs are reported honestly. If costs are understated, licenses FIG 
Ž .
are scarce and p is determined by yCЈ и , the inverse demand curve for licenses. If costs are exaggerated, then the rebate e puts a floor on p. In either case, p ) p*. As firms' total costs are increasing in p, it follows that each firm's costs will Ž . Ž .
Note that the rebate e never has to be paid in equilibrium; the level of emissions chosen by firms at the prevailing market price just equals the number of licenses issued. Note also the role played by the marginal damage function in the proof of Ž . Ž . Kwerel's theorem. Any increasing function could be substituted for DЈ и in Eq. 2 Ž . and firms would still be motivated to reveal their true cost functions; DЈ и plays no role in ensuring that Kwerel's scheme is incentive compatible. However, the Ž . Ž . function on the right-hand side of Eq. 2 must be DЈ и in order for Kwerel's scheme to be optimum achieving.
It is useful to examine the sense in which Kwerel's scheme can be said to be incentive compatible. First, truth telling is a Nash equilibrium under Kwerel's scheme; each firm will reveal its cost function truthfully if it believes other firms will do the same. Moreover, if a firm believes that some other firm is going to misrepresent its cost function, then the first firm will be motivated to misrepresent Ž . Ž . its cost function in a compensatory manner, i.e., so that C и will equal C и . I will characterize the sort of equilibrium described here by the phrase ''incentive compatible in the sense of Kwerel.'' Kwerel describes this sort of equilibrium as having a ''strong stability property,'' but this may be an exaggeration. Dasgupta et w x al. 12 criticize Kwerel on this point and suggest an alternative scheme based on the GrovesrClarkrVickrey public choice mechanism that makes truth telling a dominant strategy.
THE OPTIMAL TRAJECTORY OF EMISSIONS AND POLLUTION
In this section I consider a persistent pollutant, show how Kwerel's conceptual framework may be extended to this situation, and examine the optimal trajectories of emissions and pollution.
Two changes are required to extend Kwerel's framework to a dynamic setting. First, an argument t must be appended to variables to indicate time; for example, Ž . u t denotes the total emissions during period t, where t s 1, 2, 3, . . . , T, and T is a Ž . planning horizon which may be infinite . Second, we must distinguish between Ž . Ž. emissions a flow variable and the stock of pollution in the environment. Let x t be defined as the amount of pollution in the environment at the beginning of Ž . period t and assume that the dynamics of x t are governed by the following ''state equation'': for t s 1, 2, . . . , T y 1,
The parameter ␦ measures the decay rate of the pollutant and is assumed to be between 0 and 1. The damage, in monetary terms, caused by pollution during w Ž . Ž .x Ž . period t is assumed to be given by D x t q u t . The damage function D и is assumed to be increasing, strictly convex, and public knowledge, as in the previous Ž . section. The minimal cost to firm i to reduce its emissions to u t during period t i w Ž .x is assumed to be given by C u t , where we make the same assumptions about are defined exactly as in the previous section. We assume that the regulatory agency wishes to minimize
where ␤ is a social discount factor between 0 and 1. Some of the assumptions of this model demand comment. In particular, to assume that the cost to reduce emissions depends only on the new level of emissions is a very crude approximation to reality. Switching to a new level of emissions involves changes in operating procedure and in pollution abatement equipment. Insofar as capital markets are not perfect and pollution abatement equipment is generally an irreversible investment, switching to a new rate of emissions imposes a charge that is not captured in the formulation of the cost function given above. This defect is not serious if the switch is once and for all, as in Kwerel's paper. However, if the firm is required continually to change its emissions, then this defect is extremely serious. Unfortunately, incorporation of a more realistic cost function in the model appears to be intractable.
An apparent flaw of the model is that the damage function, the individual cost functions, and the number of firms are not allowed to vary with time. The damage function should change with the size of the impacted population, the cost functions should change with changes in abatement technology, and the number of firms may increase or decrease. These changes cannot realistically be regarded as either entirely endogenous or as entirely exogenous to the model. Also, of course, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty about these changes. This flaw appears to be Ž . quite severe, but in fact as shown in Section 6 it can be removed completely.
The next order of business is to find the necessary conditions that characterize an optimal trajectory of emissions. For this purpose, consider the ''optimal emissions problem'': what time course of aggregate emissions would the agency mandate if they knew the true aggregate cost function? Put differently, the problem is Ä Ž . 4 Ž . to choose u t : 1 F t F T to minimize J subject to u t G 0 and the state equation. The most straightforward way to obtain the conditions that characterize an optimal trajectory of emissions is to treat the optimal emissions problem as a discrete time optimal control problem. This approach also yields a nice picture of the optimal trajectory of emissions and pollution and some other results that will be required later. Because the optimal emissions problem under perfect certainty about costs has been explored in the literature, I merely summarize my conclusions Ž . Ž . Ž here. We introduce Lagrange multipliers 1 through T y 1 corresponding to . the state equation at these times , define a Lagrangian, and differentiate with Ž . Ž . Ž . respect to x t , u t , and t to obtain the Kuhn᎐Tucker conditions for the optimal emissions problem. The Lagrange multipliers may be eliminated from these equations and the system reduced to the state equation and
Ž . Ž . for t s 1, 2, . . . , T y 1. Equations 3 and 5 constitute an autonomous system of Ž . Ž . forward difference equations for x t and u t . This system is a ''two point Ž boundary value problem'' in that we have one initial condition the specified value Ž .. of x 1 and one terminal condition given by
Some variant of the ''shooting method'' is required to solve this system of Ž . equations. Briefly, we repeatedly choose u 1 until the terminal condition is satisfied.
Ž . Subject to certain mathematical caveats, the solution trajectories of Eqs. 3 and Ž . 5 have the character shown in Fig. 2 . The ''terminal surface'' is defined as the set Ž . Ž . of points that satisfy CЈ u q DЈ x q u s 0. The '' x isocline'' is defined as the locus of points where x is unchanging in one time step; from the state equation, Ž . the x isocline is a straight line of slope 1 y ␦ r␦ through the origin. The ''u isocline'' is defined as the locus of points where u is unchanging in one time step.
Ž . It follows from Eq. 5 that the u isocline is downward sloping. These facts imply Ž . that the x isocline and the u isocline intersect at a single equilibrium point x, u . Ž . The x and u isoclines divide the positive x, u quadrant into four regions. The direction of trajectories in each region and the direction of trajectories where they Ž . cross the isoclines can be determined; this ''directional analysis'' implies that x, u is a ''saddle point. ' . Given x 1 , the initial stock of pollution, u 1 , must be chosen so that x T , u T is on the terminal surface. A typical trajectory is shown. separatrices. 3 The ''outbound separatrix'' consists of two trajectories that diverge Ž . directly away from x, u , and the ''inbound separatrix'' consists of two trajectories Ž . Ž Ž . Ž .. that converge into x, u . All trajectories whose starting point x 1 , u 1 does not lie on the inbound separatrix diverge away from the inbound separatrix and converge toward one of the limbs of the outbound separatrix. The directional analysis shows that the inbound separatrix is negatively sloped.
s Ž . Let u x denote the u coordinate of the inbound separatrix for any level of Ž . Ž . pollution x. The initial pollution level x 1 is given and u 1 must be chosen so that Ž Ž . Ž ..
x T , u T is on the terminal surface. The larger T is, the closer to the inbound Ž . Ž . separatrix u 1 must be chosen. In the limit, if T is infinite, u 1 must be chosen ÄŽ Ž . Ž .. on the inbound separatrix. In this case, the optimal trajectory x t , u t : t s 4 Ž . Ž 1, 2, . . . is the inbound separatrix and never diverges from x, u along the . outbound separatrix to reach the terminal surface. More precisely, when T is infinite we have the following feedback law for optimal current emissions u as a function of the current level of pollution x:
We assume that in fact the regulatory agency takes T as infinite; the case of finite T is of interest primarily as a mathematical convenience to give us a handle on the infinite T case.
As shown in Fig. 2 , the inbound separatrix may intersect the x axis at some point Ž .
Ž . 
This is true whether the time horizon T is finite or infinite.
THE DYNAMIC KWEREL SCHEME
In this section I construct a dynamic version of Kwerel's scheme and show Ž . under some weak conditions that it is incentive compatible and optimum achieving. This ''dynamic Kwerel scheme'' consists of a sequence of ''one shot Kwerel schemes,'' i.e., Kwerel schemes that are in effect for just one period.
Treating the optimal emissions problem as a discrete time optimal control Ž . Ž . problem gives us Fig. 2 and Eqs. 7 and 8 , but it is not clear that this approach is useful for the design of regulations. The two parameters of Kwerel's scheme are given by the coordinates of the intersection of two curves, but it is not apparent that points on the inbound separatrix can be characterized in this way. Hence it is not clear how Kwerel's scheme can be generalized to a dynamic setting. Examina-Ž . Ž tion of Fig. 1 suggests that what is required is a function G¨; x analogous to Ž .. Ž . DЈ¨that is increasing in¨and such that points on u* и satisfy yCЈ u* x s G u* x ; x . 9 Ž . Ž . Ž .
3 w x For more on separatrices, including effective methods to compute them, see Clark 9 and Conrad w x and Clark 10 . 
Ž .
Optimal emissions given T and x, denoted u* T, x , is defined to be the value of the argument u that minimizes the expression within the braces on the right-hand Ž . side of Eq. 12 ; using the ''argmin'' notation,
Ž . Now let t s T y 1, T y 2, . . . , 1. For any t, and letting x s x t , we define the value function and optimal emissions feedback law by
Ž . Letting JЈ ии denote the partial derivative of J ии with respect to its second Ž . argument, the first order condition for u ' u* t, x is
It is convenient to write the first order conditions for u* T, x and u* t, x in an Ž . alternative form. Define G¨; t, x as
5 It may be shown that the discrete time optimal control and dynamic programming approaches to the optimal emissions problem are mathematically identical. The connections between the two approaches w x are explored in 6 . In principle, therefore, solving the optimal emissions problem using just one of these approaches would be sufficient to obtain all needed results. In practice, the most straightforward and intuitive way to obtain all the results we need is to use both of these approaches. Ž . whenever u ' u* t, x ) 0. These results are illustrated in Fig. 3 . Ž . It can be shown that G¨; t, 0 is a strictly increasing function of¨. Inspection of Ž . Ž . the definition of G иии reveals that the curve of G¨; t, x versus¨for any x and Ž . t is just the curve of G¨; t, 0 shifted left by x units. Combining these two Ž . observations, we see that as x increases, the intersection point of yCЈ¨and Ž . G¨; t, x shifts to the left along the marginal cost curve. If the leftward shift is Ž . Ž . large enough, the curves of G¨; t, x and yCЈ¨will not intersect in the positive quadrant. Hence we have the following theorem.
Ž . Ž .
Using this notation, the first order conditions for u* t, x including t s T may be written as yCЈ u
Ž . THEOREM 2. For any t and x, G¨; t, x is a strictly increasing function of¨. For
Ž .
Ž . any t, JЈ t, x is a strictly increasing function of x, u* t, x is a strictly decreasing
Ž . Ž . function of x for x less than some critical¨alue x t which may be infinite , and
Under conditions which are satisfied by the optimal emissions problem, 6 for any Ž . fixed t, as T increases to infinity the value function J t, и and optimal emissions Ž . Ž . feedback law u* t, и approach functions that are independent of t. Let J и and Ž . u* и denote these functions. They satisfy
Ž . the first order condition for u* x may be written yCЈ u F G u, x with equality if u s u* x ) 0.
Ž .
This shows that points on the inbound separatrix can be characterized by the Ž . coordinates of the intersection of two curves. Analogous to Eq. 18 , it can be Ž . w Ž . x Ž . Ž . shown that JЈ x s G u* x ; x . Hence, when u ' u* x ) 0, we have JЈ x s Ž . Ž . yCЈ u s G u; x . These results are illustrated in Fig. 4 
is the x intercept of the inbound separatrix.
crit crit
These results suggest two dynamic Kwerel schemes: one that is appropriate when the planning horizon T is finite, and one that is appropriate when T is infinite. The ''finite time horizon dynamic Kwerel scheme'' is defined as follows.
Ž . 1 The agency announces T, solicits firms' cost functions, and calculates thê
Ž . reported cost function C и . They then calculate a sequence of functions 4 . Determination of L x , e x , u t , p t , u* x , and p* t at any time t with pollution level Ž . Ä Ž . Ž .4 x s x t under the long run dynamic Kwerel scheme and assuming that min u* x , L x ) 0.Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . G и ; t, и , J t, и , L t, и , and e t, и for t s T, T y 1, . . . , 1 using the algorithm described in the next two steps.Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .
For any x G 0, define G¨; T, x , J T, x , L T, x , and e T, x bŷ
, and e t, x bŷĜ¨; Fig. 3 . 
The determination of L t, x and e t, x is illustrated in

Ž .
For C и to be a plausible candidate for an aggregate cost function, it mustŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž . possess the basic properties of C и . As J ии , G иии , and L ии have the samê Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . relationship to C и as J ии , G иии , and u* ии respectively have to C и , it followŝŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . that J ии , G иии , and L ии have the same properties as J ии , G иии , and u* ии . HenceˆĴ 4 k s 0, 1, 2, . . . as described in the next step.
Ž . 2 For any
For any x G 0 and for k s 1, 2, 3, . . . , letˆĴ
For any x G 0, define J x to be the limit of J k, x as k increases tô Ž . Ž . Ž . infinity. For any x G 0, define G¨; x , L x , and e x bŷĜ¨;
Ž . mination of L x and e x is shown in Fig. 4 .
Ž . 4 At any time t, a one shot Kwerel scheme is in effect. The parameters L and
Ž . e of the one shot Kwerel scheme depend on x t through the mechanism We have now introduced two dynamic Kwerel schemes: the finite time horizon and the long run schemes. In practice, I believe, the long run scheme should be used. The finite time horizon scheme is of interest primarily as a means to investigate the properties of the long run scheme. Using this strategy, I have been able to prove that the long run Kwerel scheme is incentive compatible and optimum achieving under two conditions imposed on the reported cost functionŽ
To state these conditions, we define ⌬C¨' yCЈ¨y yCЈ¨for any
Ž .
We have previously used the fact that locally, i.e., at a particular value¨, ⌬Cï s either positive, negative, or zero. Condition 1, in contrast, asserts a global Ž . Ž . property of ⌬C и . Henceforth, we say ''costs are exaggerated'' if ⌬C¨) 0 for all w 0 . Ž . w 0 . g 0, u , and ''costs are understated'' if ⌬C¨-0 for all¨g 0, u . Condition 1, I believe, is a mere convenience that allows us to classify any cost Ž . report C и as being either honest, exaggerated, or understated. The second condition is less innocuous and less intuitive. It is reasonable to suppose that the regulatory agency knows u 0 , the level of emissions that would occur in the absence of regulation. Therefore, any plausiblê 0 Ž . < Ž .< cost report will have yCЈ u s 0. Hence, any cost report must have ⌬C0 < Ž .< decrease to zero as¨ª u . Condition 2 asserts that this local property of ⌬C0 w 0 . near u actually holds throughout 0, u for understated cost reports.
Although these two conditions appear reasonable, they are not directly enforce-Ž . able, as they depend on the unknown cost function C и . However, the agency can Ž . make an assumption about the mathematical form of C и and can require that Ž . each firm's cost report C и have a particular mathematical form. If the assumed i and required forms are chosen suitably, then Conditions 1 and 2 will be satisfied.
0
For example, if the agency assumes that C и is quadratic with vertex at u and
0Ž
. Ž . requires that C и be quadratic with vertex at u , then C и will be quadratic with i i 0Ž . Ž . vertex at u , the marginal cost functions yCЈ и and yCЈ и will be linear with u intercept u 0 , and Conditions 1 and 2 will be satisfied. This particular matched assumption and requirement are explored in some detail in Appendix B.
Suppose, then, that the agency has announced the long run Kwerel scheme, Ž . Ž . collected firms' cost reports, calculated C и , and constructed the functions L и Ž . w Ž .x Ž . and e и . At any time t, if L x t ) 0 we assume as in Kwerel's scheme that a Ž . competitive market for licenses will develop and let p t denote the price of a w Ž .x license. Similarly, if costs are reported honestly and if u* x t ) 0 at some time t, Ž . we let p* t denote the market price of a license. The two major results of this paper may then be stated as follows. The proof of these theorems is relegated to Appendix A.
CONCLUSION
It was noted in Section 3 that Kwerel's scheme is an ''anonymous regulatory Ž . mechanism'': it does not require the agency to have a prior opinion about C и , it Ž . does not assume that C и has any particular functional form, and it does not Ž . Ž . restrict the form of the deviation of C и from C и . These are obviously attractive features, so it is disappointing that the dynamic Kwerel scheme satisfies just thê Ž . first. In order to constrain C и to satisfy Conditions 1 and 2, it is necessary to Ž . make an assumption about the functional form of C и and impose a matchinĝ Ž . requirement on the form of C и . It is worthwhile to compare the dynamic Kwerel scheme with Sappington and Ž . Sibley's ''incremental surplus subsidy'' ISS scheme. The ISS scheme is fully an anonymous regulatory mechanism, whereas the dynamic Kwerel scheme is not. On the other hand, the dynamic Kwerel scheme is fully optimum achieving whereas the ISS scheme is not. Under the dynamic Kwerel scheme, firms reveal their cost Ž .
Ž . functions truthfully and the consequent functions L и and e и are such as to guarantee the optimal level of emissions at every time thereafter. In contrast, the Ž ISS scheme allows the regulated firm to earn positive rents in the first period but . not thereafter .
Whereas the ISS scheme is used to regulate a monopolist, the dynamic Kwerel scheme is used to regulate the emissions from n firms, where n is reasonably large. The dynamic Kwerel scheme uses the assumption that n is large in two ways. First, this assumption motivates and partially justifies the assumption that a competitive market for licenses will develop in each period and that firms take the market price of a license as exogenously given. Second, in the analysis of firm i's optimization Ž . problem in Appendix A , it is argued that it is reasonable for firm i to disregard its individual contribution to pollution in subsequent periods; this allows firm i to Ž . Ž . choose u t and L t ''myopically,'' i.e., considering only current conditions. I i i believe this feature of the dynamic Kwerel scheme may be an example of a more Ž general phenomenon: a regulator of a large number of firms each with private . information may have an easier time finding an incentive compatible and optimum achieving scheme than a regulator of a monopolist as competition in various Ž . markets restricts or even eliminates the firms' freedom to engage in strategic deception.
It was noted in Section 4 that the model apparently does not allow changes in the number of firms, the individual cost functions, or the damage function.
Ž . Theorem 3 allows this flaw to be removed. Consider changes in C и , firm i's cost i function. An important feature of the dynamic Kwerel scheme is that it rewards Ž . Ž . truth telling in e¨ery period t. In particular, p* 1 F p 1 , so the firm is rewarded at time 1 for a truthful cost report. 7 Suppose the agency modifies the long run dynamic Kwerel scheme so that firms may update their reported cost function at Ž . Ž . Ž . any time. The new functions G ии , L и , and e и are then calculated and applied beginning in the subsequent period. Under this scheme, firms never have an incentive to lie; instead, they have an incentive to report changes in their cost functions as quickly and accurately as possible. Moreover, they also have an incentive to invest in technology that will lower their costs. The same argument Ž . applies to changes in n and D и . As long as these parameters are public knowledge, changes in their values do not affect firms' incentives to tell the truth under the long run dynamic Kwerel scheme.
The temporal flexibility of the dynamic Kwerel scheme ameliorates to some extent the unpleasant need to impose a matched assumption and requirement on Ž . Ž . the forms of C и and C и . Ž . This is a slight simplification. If the initial level of pollution x 1 is high enough, the initial number w Ž .x of licenses L x 1 will be zero. In this case the firm is not really rewarded at time 1 for a truthful cost Ž . Ž . report, nor are they penalized, and the inequality p* 1 F p 1 is replaced by the statement that Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . p* t F p t for any time t G t, where t is the earliest time at which both p* t and p t are defined.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREMS 3 AND 4
Ž .
In the finite time horizon dynamic Kwerel scheme, if the level of pollution x t w Ž .x is sufficiently high at some time t, then L t, x t will equal zero and the market Ž . price of a license p t will not be defined. Similarly, the optimal level of emissions w Ž .x Ž . u* t, x t may equal zero and p* t will not be defined. These facts complicate the proofs of some of the propositions of this paper as they multiply the number of cases that need separate consideration. To simplify the exposition, throughout this w Ž .x w Ž .x appendix I make the implicit assumption that both L t, x t and u* t, x t are Ž . Ž . positive so that p t and p* t are well defined. All theorems are valid as stated, Ž w x . but the proofs given here are incomplete. For complete proofs, see 6 . To prove Theorems 3 and 4, we need to prove that they also hold for the finite time horizon dynamic Kwerel scheme. We begin by considering the problem facing firm i when this scheme is announced. It is convenient to break this problem intô Ž . Ž two subproblems. The analysis of firm i's first subproblem yields three major conclusions. First, it is in the firm's interest to minimize the price of a pollution license at each time.
Ž . Second, the price of a pollution license at time t, denoted p t , is given bŷ 
Suppose firm i attacks this subproblem using dynamic programming. At each time Ž . t they define a value function J t, x . At t s T,
and for t s T y 1, T y 2, . . . ,
where 
The following proofs are all ''dynamic programming induction proofs,'' as they start at time T and work backward. The situation at time T therefore serves as thê Ž . Ž . Ž . foundation of these proofs. Because G¨; T, x s G¨; T, x s DЈ x q¨, the situation at T is relatively uncomplicated and is shown in Fig. 5 Fig. 3 . This proves the theorem when costs are exaggerated; the proof when costs are understated is exactly parallel. Proof. As shown in Fig. 5 , the conclusion of the theorem is true when t s T. Now let t s T y 1, T y 2, . . . , 1 and take as the induction hypothesis that < w Ž . x< < w Ž . x< Ž . Ž . ⌬G L t q 1, x ; t q 1, x -⌬C L t q 1, x and L t q 1, x F u* t q 1, x for˜˜˜Ž . Ž . any x. From Eq. A5 and Theorem 5, for any x ' x t we havẽ⌬ G L t, x ; t , x s ␦␤ JЈ t q 1, x y JЈ t q 1, x A6 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .w Ž .x where x ' ␦ x q L t, x . As shown in Fig. 3 For an informal proof, see Fig. 3 .
Ž . Combining the observation that each firm's total cost is minimized when p t is minimized with the corollaries of Theorems 5 and 6, we have: Our interest in the finite time horizon dynamic Kwerel scheme is mainly as a means to explore the properties of the long run dynamic Kwerel scheme. As the long run scheme is just the limiting scheme implied by letting T increase to infinity, Theorems 3 and 4 follow as corollaries of Theorems 7 and 8.
APPENDIX B: AN EXAMPLE
The proofs given in Appendix A, while abstractly convincing, are somewhat Ž . unsatisfying, as they give very little idea of the appearance of the functions G ии Ž . and J и . An example will help to fill this lacuna.
Suppose that the damage function and each individual cost function are quadratic. More specifically, suppose that 2
